Deepening decentralisation through non-partisan district assembly system in Ghana by Adamtey, R
Journal of Science and Technology  © KNUST April 2014 
DEEPENING DECENTRALISATION THROUGH  
NON-PARTISAN DISTRICT ASSEMBLY SYSTEM IN GHANA 
Ronald Adamtey 
 Department of Planning, KNUST, Kumasi 
radamtey@yahoo.com 
ABSTRACT 
There is no consensus among scholars as to whether competitive partisan elections at Ghana’s 
district assembly level can help deepen the country’s decentralization system. It remains unclear 
whether a non-partisan district Assembly can work in Ghana. To address this issue, extensive 
qualitative interviews were conducted with local government officers in five municipalities. An in
-depth analysis of the legal framework within which decentralisation reforms are implemented 
was also undertaken. The study found that a non-partisan district Assembly system seems more 
of an illusion than reality due to the enduring strength of informal ties, heavy politicization of 
the district assemblies and numerous challenges confr ting the Assembly members.  In addi-
tion, the constitution still empowers the president to appoint District Chief Executives and one-
third of the membership of the district assemblies. It is recommended that in order to deepen the 
country’s democracy, the legal framework need to be revised for competitive partisan elections to 
be pursued and Assembly members must be paid for their work. 
Keywords: Decentralisation, devolution, district assembly, informal ties, Ghana  
INTRODUCTION 
Political decentralisation in Ghana was shaped 
by claims in the decentralisation literature that 
devolution can lead to responsive governance 
outcomes. The argument that devolution can 
lead to responsiveness is based on two assump-
tions. The first assumption is that local politi-
cians are close to the people so they are in a 
better position to use local knowledge to de-
liver appropriate needs. The second assumption 
is that democratic decentralisation can enable 
citizens at the local level to hold public officers 
accountable for their actions as they can vote 
out councilors that they find to be corrupt or 
inefficient. The pressure of electoral politics 
can therefore motivate rational public officers 
to be more responsive to citizens (Ayee, 2008; 
Agyeman-Duah, 2005; Crook, 2003). 
 
Another claim is that devolution can produce 
strong democracy and civic awareness, and the 
development of citizens’ political capacity to 
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engage with state institutions. This process can 
lead to increasing the level of civic conscious-
ness of citizens at the local level who might rise 
to engage in politics at the national level and 
take charge of national public office. Political 
decentralisation is also said to enable citizens to 
participate in the decision making process 
(Crawford, 2008; Grindle, 2007). Overall, de-
mocracy can be strengthened through active 
participation of citizens which is one indication 
of good governance. 
 
One of the major requirements for devolution 
to work is the autonomy of local government 
bodies (Ayee, 2004a; 2004b; Olowu and 
Wunsch, 2004). In Ghana, the Local Govern-
ment Act, 462 of 1993 seeks to achieve auton-
omy of district assemblies through a non-
partisan Assembly. This can be found in the 
mode of seeking elections into the Assembly 
which is enshrined in the Local Government 
Act 1993 (Act 462). According to the Republic 
of Ghana (1993), the Mode of seeking election 
to the District Assembly as provided in Section 
7 are as follows:  
 
• A candidate seeking election to a District 
Assembly or to a lower local government 
unit shall personally appear before the 
electorate as an individual, and shall not 
use a symbol associated with a political 
party. 
 
• A political party shall not endorse, spon-
sor, offer a platform to or in any other way 
campaign for or against a candidate seek-
ing election to a District Assembly or to a 
lower local government unit. 
 
• A candidate who contravenes subsection 
(1) commits an offence and on conviction 
the Electoral Commission shall cancel the 
nomination of that candidate. 
 
• A political party which contravenes sub-
section (2) commits an offence and is li-
able on conviction to a fine not exceeding 
two hundred and fifty penalty units. 
Existing studies on Ghana’s decentralisation 
reforms do not adequately provide answers as 
to whether these provisions can work and 
whether non-partisan District Assembly system 
can be achieved. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The paper employed a cross-case analysis to 
xamine variations in the ways in which five 
Municipal Assemblies worked over a period of 
twelve years from 2000 to 2012. The focus is 
on the informal ties existing between the Mu-
nicipal Chief Executives and Assembly mem-
bers. Although other informal ties such as eth-
nic, old-school, family and neighbourhood rela-
tions exist in these cases, the focus of this paper 
is on political party ties. This covers the devo-
lution that the paper seeks to explore. The work 
analyses how political party networks can un-
dermine or enhance the desire of the Municipal 
Chief Executives and their Assembly members 
(both elected and appointed) to be non-partisan. 
The data are mainly in the form of narratives of 
experiences told by the Municipal Chief Execu-
tives and the Assembly members.  
 
Employing the case study approach emphasis-
ing narratives has the advantage of allowing 
respondents to express their views and senti-
ments which often times are missed in other 
equally good approaches such as statistical 
analysis (Thomas, 2011; Gerring, 2007). In 
addition to attending Assembly meetings of all 
the five cases to understand the influences of 
political party ties and how they manifest and 
shape decision making at the Assembly, the 
existence of these ties were obtained through 
the administration of questionnaire to 100 As-
sembly members (20 in each of the five cases) 
who were randomly selected from both elected 
and appointed members. The selected members 
and their five Municipal Chief Executives were 
asked to indicate their political party affiliation. 
The registers of memberships of political par-
ties in the municipalities were obtained from 
the party offices and used to validate the re-
sponses from the interviews. 
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The information obtained was analysed and 
results presented in Table 1, showing the exis-
tence of political party ties between each of the 
MCEs and the 20 Assembly members. In order 
to determine the strength of these ties, a num-
ber of steps were followed: First, each of the 
five cases was represented by letters A, B, C, 
D, and E in the first column of the table. Sec-
ond, the Assembly members interviewed were 
numbered from 1 to 20 in the second row of the 
table. Third, the existing ties were indicated 
and summed up to obtain the total available 
ties. Fourth, since each case is supposed to 
score a maximum of 20 (that is when the tie 
exists between the MCE and all the 20 Assem-
bly members), the total available tie was di-
vided by the maximum score which is 20 to 
obtain the proportion of existing tie as against 
the maximum score. Fifth, the values obtained 
were converted to percentages to obtain the 
scores in the last column. Sixth, a scale was 
adopted for the interpretation and determination 
of the strength of the ties. Political party ties are
weak when the score is between 0 and 49% 
and strong when it is 50% and more (Table 1). 
 
THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH 
DEVOLUTION CAN WORK 
Much of the literature regarding devolution has 
tended to attribute the failure or success of de-
centralisation reforms to factors at the national 
level such as the political commitment of na-
tional leaders, issues of elite capture of the re-
form process, and the legal and institutional 
framework within which local government bod-
ies operate (see, for example, the works of Con-
yers, 2007; Robinson, 2007; Bardhan and 
Mookherjee, 2006; Crook and Sverrisson, 
2003). There is relatively little work which 
examines how complete autonomy of devolved 
bodies within a uniformly decentralised system 
can be realised particularly in countries such as 
Ghana where socio-political and cultural issues 
form the core of social organisation. Current 
literature does not seem to have critically ex-
amined the social and cultural issues such as 
informal networks existing between actors in 
decentralised institutions at sub-national level 
as having the potential to shape both the proc-
ess and outcome of decentralisation reforms. 
 
The very nature of social organization in Ghana 
appears to make it practically difficult for de-
volved and non-partisan Assembly to operate. 
The importance of social relations is increas-
ingly recognized in other aspects of govern-
ance, but very little attention is given to how it 
can contribute to our understanding of decen-
tralization. Societies in many countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa are highly organized around 
informal networks: friendship ties, family and 
kinship relations, ethnic and hometown net-
works, religious affiliations and political party 
ties (Crook and Booth, 2011; Leonard, 2009; 
Blundo et al., 2006). These relationships con-
stitute strong forces that shape many people’s 
behaviour.  
 
So how can informal ties between key officers 
and elected Assembly members enhance or 
constrain the realisation of a non-partisan As-
sembly? Beyond informal ties, are there other 
factors that point to the inability of Ghana’s 
decentralisation reforms to be non-partisan?  
 
THE ROLE OF INFORMAL TIES 
According to Coleman (1991), informal ties are 
relationships between people at a personal 
level. They may include a complex combina-
tion of “weak ties (relationship with acquaint-
ances and friends of friends) and strong ties 
(relationship with friends, relatives and 
neighbours)” (Granovetter, 1983: 207). Grode-
land (2005: 5) has noted that an “informal net-
work is an informal circle of people able to and 
willing to help each other.”  The common in-
formal ties in Africa and Ghana are family, 
kingship, neighbhourhood, religious and old-
school networks. All these ties shape peoples’ 
attitudes and day-to-day decisions are rooted in 
them (Phinney, 1990; Young, 2004; Hanson, 
2004). In reality, the various forms of informal 
ties overlap in a very complex way. As the fo-
cus of this paper is on devolution, the discus-
sion has focused on political party ties.  
 
Journal of Science and Technology  © KNUST April 2014 
78 










































































   
   








































































  1 
  2
 
  3 
  4 
  5 
  6 
  7 
  8 




























































































































































































Political party ties 
Political party affiliations are the ties that exist 
among members of a political party. They are 
so strong that they are likely to strengthen these 
other ties particularly ethnic relations. For ex-
ample, in most parts of Africa, there are ethnic 
groups that are known to have strong allegiance 
to certain political parties. But this is no sur-
prise as most of the political parties in Africa 
are rooted in ethnic solidarities (Morrison, 
2004; Tignor, 1993; Newbury, 1992). The his-
tory of Ghana’s political development strongly 
supports this assertion. Chazan (1982) has 
noted that:  
 
“Ethnic politics, despite severe vacillations in 
regime types and ideological predictions, 
have come to play increasingly prominent 
roles in Ghanaian politics since independ-
ence in 1957. Control of state power has 
moved from southern Akan groups during 
the Nkrumah years; through a Ga-Ewe coali-
tion under the National Liberation Council 
(NLC); the central Akan (Asante-Brong) 
alliance of Busia; the ethnically more bal-
anced National Redemption Council (NRC) 
– Supreme Military Council (SMC) constel-
lation; a minority agglomeration with dispro-
portionate northern representation in the ad-
ministration of the Third Republic; and fi-
nally to heavily Ewe-based ruling clique in 
the Provisional National Defence Coun-
cil” (Chazan, 1982: 461). 
 
A very important product which is likely to 
result from informal relations is the issue of 
trust between members who share these bonds. 
Trust will be defined in this paper as the situa-
tion in which an individual in the network is 
confident to deal with all others who are mem-
bers of the network in a transparent and honest 
way without suspicion or doubt and he or she is 
convinced that the others deal with him or her 
in the same way. Trust is needed to sustain 
informal networks and facilitate the exchange 
of reciprocal support system within formal rela-
tions. 
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FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
The findings from the study are the enduring 
strength and influence of informal relations, 
heavy politicisation of the Assembly system, 
the influences of the political ambitions of the 
Municipal Chief Executives and a number of 
challenges confronting the Assembly members. 
These are presented and discussed next. 
 
Enduring strength of informal relations 
Overall, there were strong informal ties be-
tween the Municipal Chief Executives and 
elected Assembly members. All the five cases 
recorded the existence of strong ties. For exam-
ple, both cases A and C recorded 70% and the 
remaining three cases recorded between 60% 
and 65%. This finding shows that inspite of the 
fact that Assembly members will claim to be 
non-partisan and that they did not go to the 
Assembly on political party tickets, all of them 
have strong attachments and allegiances to po-
litical parties. Many political parties are built 
around long held ideologies and philosophies 
that are historically enduring. For example, in 
Ghana, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) is 
claimed by its members to be rooted in the be-
liefs and ideologies of J. B. Danquah, Dombo 
and K. A. Busia. Similarly, the Convention 
Peoples Party (CPP) has claimed to be champi-
oning the vision of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. 
Given these claims, it means that members of 
such parties will uphold these philosophies and 
act in line with them. Given the overlap be-
tween political ideologies and human actions it 
can be argued that a truly non-partisan Assem-
bly is unlikely to be achieved. 
 
Heavy politicisation of the Assembly 
The Assemblies in all the five cases were found 
to be heavily politicised.  Relationships were 
affected by the personal political ambitions of 
the Municipal Chief Executives, Presiding 
Members, and most Assembly members which 
resulted in instances of personality clashes 
among the Chief Executives, Presiding mem-
bers, and Assembly members.  All the Chief 
Executives sought to hinder the Assembly 
members they perceived as threats to their per- 
sonal ambition to become members of parlia-
ment, and also push the agenda of their parties 
in the Metropolitan, Municipal and District 
Assemblies (MMDAs). All the elected Assem-
bly members said they were unable to influence 
decisions at the Assembly due to the Chief Ex-
ecutives’ manipulation of Assembly business. 
For example one of the Assembly members 
indicated that: 
 
“The MCE has managed to get his people to 
be chairpersons of the important sub-
committees. These Sub-committee chairper-
sons therefore work for the MCE such that 
issues that the MCE does not like would not 
pass through to the Executive Committee for 
consideration and then brought to the general 
Assembly for deliberation” [Elected Assem-
bly member].  
 
Over 80% of the Assembly members claimed 
that they were scared of their Chief Executives 
because they could cause them to lose their 
seats. As one of them explained:  
 
“Since 2000, the MCE funded the campaigns 
of my opponents against me. Unfortunately 
for him, my people like me, so each time 
they vote for me that is why I have been in 
the Assembly for all the three terms. On one 
occasion, my opponent came to inform me 
about it. A number of people also came to 
inform me that the MCE had brought money 
to be shared for people to vote for my oppo-
nent. About five Assembly members have 
been victims and they all lost their seats.” 
 
In one of the cases, the MCE had the power to 
push the party’s agenda due to his party ties 
and the support of one-third of the members of 
the Assembly who were government appoint-
ees. He also sponsored 10 party members to 
contest the District Assembly elections in 2006 
and six of them won giving him substantial 
support from the elected Assembly members. 
He also got his party member elected as the 
Presiding Member of the Assembly. All these 
steps made it easier for him to push his agenda  
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through in the Assembly even when some 
members strongly opposed his decisions. 
 
Similar to the first Municipality, the Presiding 
Member also played an important role in the 
second Municipality where he supported the 
Municipal Chief Executive on most issues. As 
the Standing Orders provide, the Assembly 
members are supposed to ‘catch the eye’ of the 
Speaker of the Assembly (the Presiding Mem-
ber) and it appeared that he used this provision 
to the advantage of the Chief Executive. Ac-
cording to about 80% of the elected Assembly 
members, the Presiding Member decided not to 
‘see’ those members who opposed the agenda 
set by the Chief Executive. Based on events 
observed during the Assembly meeting, it ap-
pears the way in which the Presiding Member 
steers the meeting shapes the outcome as the 
Assembly members who were known to be 
vocal and opposed the Chief Executive were 
not ‘seen’ by the Presiding Member even 
though they raised their hands and sometimes 
called out the Presiding Member’s name to 
draw his attention. Two examples of projects 
where the Presiding Member used this strategy 
to support the Chief Executive’s agenda are 
given below. The first case was narrated by one 
of the Assembly members: 
 
“The Chief Executive was able to cause the 
Municipal Assembly to commit an amount of 
150,000 Ghana Cedis to supplement an elec-
trification project (street lights) some three 
months before the Presidential and Parlia-
mentary elections in 2008. He insisted that 
the 350,000 Ghana Cedis which the central 
government had brought for the electrifica-
tion project was inadequate and that he 
needed the 150,000 Ghana Cedis to pay for 
labour cost. Most Assembly members op-
posed this. We suggested that the 150,000 
Ghana Cedis should rather be used to com-
plete an office for the National Health Insur-
ance Scheme which was about 60% complete 
and had been abandoned for lack of funds. 
We argued that this would save the assembly 
from paying the exorbitant rent for office  
   which had been rented for the National 
Health Insurance Scheme. In spite of our 
opposition to this, the Chief Executive was 
able to push this agenda through when it 
came to voting because the Presiding mem-
ber refused to see several of us who raised 
our hands to oppose the motion.” 
 
In the second example, all the five government 
appointees indicated that between 2000 and 
2004 and between 2007 and 2008, the award of 
contracts for the construction of two clinics and 
one health centre met heavy opposition in the 
Assembly because there were procedural issues 
involved that the contract award process did not 
follow. The Presiding member refused ‘to see’ 
those who opposed the motion which was even-
tually carried through.  
 
All the Assembly members indicated their frus-
tration in the Assembly as their views did not 
reflect in the Assemblies’ programmes. They 
noted that they saw themselves as ‘rubber 
stamps’ in the Assembly to only vote to en-
dorse agendas that were aimed at promoting the 
aims of the party in power.  
 
Political Ambitions of Municipal Chief  
Executives 
Political ambitions of many Chief Executives 
caused them to take a number of steps that un-
dermined the role of Assembly members. Some 
Chief Executives sponsored candidates to con-
test seats of incumbent Assembly members 
who were perceived to be vocal or opponents to 
hem. In most cases, since the Chief Executives 
had resources and influence, their candidates 
won. This was a predominant practice in all the 
five cases. Chief Executives also influenced the 
election of chairpersons of the various sub-
committees. Since the chairpersons of the sub-
committees constitute the Executive Commit-
tee, the Chief Executive could ensure that 
members were sympathetic or supportive of his 
course. The one-third government appointed 
Assembly members were also likely to support 
the Chief Executive providing him with signifi-
cant control over policy outcomes. This asse- 
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rtion conforms with the findings of other schol-
ars regarding Ghana’s decentralisation pro-
gramme which is excessive dominance of na-
tional politicians in local government business 
(Abdulai and Crawford, 2010; Crawford, 2009; 
Crook, 1994).  
 
Challenges of Assembly members 
The prevalence of clientelism, nepotism, and 
cronyism involved in the Assembly election 
process was found to undermine the work of 
the Assembly members. According to the law, 
the elections are supposed to be non-partisan 
but in practice this is not the case and they are 
very expensive to contest. According to the 
Assembly members, it cost between 1500 
Ghana Cedis and 2000 Ghana Cedis to contest 
an election. Potential candidates have to fund 
their elections yet Assembly members are un-
paid. Most of them complained claiming the 
process allowed political parties and influential 
people to secretly fund candidates. This method 
was employed extensively by all the Chief Ex-
ecutives to unseat incumbent members who 
opposed them. For example, one of the 
‘victims’ of a Chief Executive’s influences 
explained her case as follows: 
 
“I realised that some of the issues that we 
raised at Sub-committee level did not appear 
on the agenda for general Assembly meet-
ings. They ended up at the Executive Com-
mittee level. I raised these issues on several 
occasions at the general Assembly meeting 
and demanded to know what happened to 
those issues.  I was perceived by the MCE as 
being anti-government. Most Assembly 
members believed this because I did not 
show my political affiliation. The MCE and 
others propagated the idea that I was against 
the government. He therefore sponsored a 
candidate but he lost. During the second elec-
tions, the issue of my political affiliation 
came up again. The MCE sponsored some-
one against me and I lost.” 
 
Interviews with some of the ‘beneficiaries’ of  
the MCE’s support echoed these observations.  
According to one of them, the MCE and a ma-
jor political party promised him continuous 
support if he agreed to contest the election and 
join the Assembly but they had not honoured 
those promises. Having realised that he was in 
the Assembly only to vote for the Chief Execu-
tive, he has decided to step down out of frustra-
tion. This was how he put it: 
 
“I was sponsored by the MCE to contest. He 
promised that he would continue to support 
me financially in so many ways. I however 
regret this because I have been unable to be 
objective during discussions in the general 
Assembly. I was forced against my will on 
some of the issues in the Assembly.” 
These findings of issues that hamper the effec-
tiveness of elected Assembly members point to 
two things. First, they further show that the 
voluntary and non-partisan nature of the job of 
an Assemblyman might deepen the frustration 
of Assembly members which would threaten 
the sustainability of this arrangement. These 
frustrations can dampen the morale and enthu-
siasm of potential Assembly persons. Second, 
the quality of debates in the general Assembly 
will be poor as they are captured and controlled 
by the few Assembly members who understand 
the legal instruments and are able to express 
themselves fluently in English and local lan-
guages. If the MCE is able to capture those few 
Assembly members who control debates in the 
Assembly, then he or she can easily steer the 
Assembly to advance his or her personal politi-
cal ambitions and party agenda instead of ad-
vancing the interests of ordinary people. 
 
The implication here is that the party agenda 
may not be the same as the interests of ordinary 
people. It is however possible that when the 
entire assembly is partisan, elected Assembly 
members might champion the cause of their 
electoral areas, similar to what pertains at the 
national level. In spite of the fact that Members 
of Parliament are elected on party tickets, many 
make the effort to seek development for their 
constituencies. 
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Rethinking competitive elections of all As-
sembly members and MCEs 
The issues about competitive election of all 
Assembly members and Municipal Chief Ex-
ecutives by citizens on political party tickets 
raise questions about effectiveness of the de-
bates and preparations that went into the design 
and formulation of the Local Government Act 
462 of 1993. A further debate of the issue 
seems necessary. As this paper has shown, po-
litical parties and powerful elites fund candi-
dates although the process is supposed to be 
non-partisan and scholars such as Crawford 
(2010); Awortwi (2010); and Agyeman-Duah 
(2005) all suggest that competitive election of 
local government officers can be helpful. Ex-
periences in other countries such as Uganda 
suggest that vibrant local council elections open 
avenues for fresh ideas and experience to be 
introduced into the local governance system at 
sub-national level. The pressure of competitive 
elections and the possibility of losing one’s job 
can motivate local government officials to be 
responsive and accountable to their electorates. 
But given the claims that elections are heavily 
influenced by vote-buying, further research is 
needed to explore the limits of competitive lo-
cal government elections. 
 
A review of existing legal arrangements for 
Assembly members to be paid 
The job of the Assembly member is voluntary 
and non-partisan and they are not paid. They 
are therefore vulnerable to exploitation. This is 
partly due to the existing legal framework over-
looking the fact that non-paid Assembly mem-
bers can fall prey to powerful interests. The on-
going initiatives and debates among scholars 
and policy makers around the weaknesses in 
the Act 462 and the call for a review are laud-
able and need to be intensified. Act 462 should 
be revised for Assembly members to be paid 
monthly salaries from the consolidated fund as 
any other public sector worker. Although this 
recommendation can increase the burden on the 
national budget, it is unlikely to be so if the 
overall economy performs well and the present   
economic crises end. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The existing arrangements with ambiguities in 
the laws are likely to continue for some time. 
One reason for maintaining this position might 
be that it allows both central government and 
sub-national level politicians and bureaucrats 
substantial control over local government busi-
ness which might enable them to project per-
sonal political ambitions and party agendas. As 
a result, the commitment to reform might be 
strong in theory and in policy but this might be 
weak in practice. This conclusion is based on 
the premise that informal relations constitute 
the basic foundation and fabric of the structure 
of socio-cultural organization in Ghana, and 
they are likely to undermine efforts geared to-
wards non-partisan Assembly. Repealing the 
r levant provisions in Act 462 for Assembly 
members to be elected and paid may not guar-
antee the development of ordinary people, but 
these steps can contribute in a significant way 
towards deepening Ghana’s decentralization 
process and democratic principles. 
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